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CHAPTER I.
A STATEIENT 0' THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS,
ITS EXTENT, REASONS and IMPORTANCE.
(1) STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE.
The rule -of Stare Decisis is of ancient
origin. Precisely when it became a distinctly estab-
lished doctrine of English law is not easy to detormine.
In Croke's Reports in the seventeenth year of the reign
of James I, 1584, (Cro.Jac.,527) the reporter summarizes
the ratio decidendi thus: "Wherefore, upon the first
argument it was adjudged for the defendant, for they
said that those things which have been so often adjudi-
cated ought to rest in peace." This seems to be a very
accurate and condensed expression of the doctrine.
The name Stare Decisis is taken from the Latin
maxim, stare decisis et non quieta movere, and the trans
lation of the maxim is a good definition of the rule
itself: To stand by prechdent and not to disturb what is
settled. It may be called the doctrine of precedent or
of authority. Its meaning is that when a point of law
has been once solemnly and necessarily sei.tled by the
decision of a competent court it will no longer be con-
siderod upen to xamination or to a new ruling by the
saoe tribunal or those which are bound to follow its
adj udications.
The general rule as laid down by the authori-
ties i,; as follows: "Precedents and rules must be fol-
lowed unless flatly absurd or unjust; for though their
reason be not obvious at first view, yet we owe such a
deference to former times as not to supi-ose that they
acted wholly without consideration;" but "if it be found
a former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it
is declared~noL that such a sentence was bad law, but
that it was not law." (1 Blackstone's Commentaries,
pp.69-70.)
It might be considered as a kind of legal
axiom that courts should not exercise their jurisdic-
tion in any random manner for this would speedily land
everything in "confusion worse confused." Of necessity
there must be certain fixed land-marks apj roaching cor-
rectness, though not infallibly perfect; and courts
should be guided by these even though a rigorous adher-
ence to them might at tines work individual hardship.
These land-marks are, of corse, yrior decisions servinm
as precedents not lightly to be changed.
(2) EXiEyT 01P THE DOCTRIAO.
The doctrine of Stare DOcisis is generally
characterized by law-writers as a product or principle
of the Coi.-ion law. Blackstone and Kent claim it as such
and the United States Supreio Court (1 LI.Coin.,70; 1
1 nt's Com.,475-479; Carrcll v. Carroll, 16 IHow.,2,37)
refers to it expressly as "a rule which belongs to the
common law" and there is an implication in the orinion
that it is limited to "courts orrganized under the conanon
law."
That it is a doctrine or rule of the cormnn
law there is no doubt, but that it belongs to the common
la,. in any exclusive sense of origin, application or
usage is incorrect. In the first place, it is a rule
equally applicable and equally applied in equity as in
the common law. Thus Blackstone says, in repelling th e
idea that equity consists of the "opinion of the judre":
*The system of our court of equity is an elaborate, con-
nected system governed by established rules and bound
down by precedents from which they do not depart alt o :-
the reason of some of them may perhaps be liable to o1-
jection." "May,' he adds, "sometiies a precedent is so
strictly followed in equity that a particular audrment
founded upon special circumstances !gives rise to a ren-
eral rule." (3 Bl. Com.,4 3 2 .)
In the next place, this doctrine may be said
to have kad its place in the Romnyn law. Thus in the new
Codex Constitutionum of Justinian, A.D.,534, the Codox
repetitae pralectionis, lib.1, tit.XIV,12, De Legibus et
constitutionibus principum et edictis, it is decreed,
(translated); "Whenever the Emperor has judicially con-
sidered a case and announced a decision to the parties
that have appeared in the controvercy, let all judges,
without exception, within our juriddiction, know that
this is the law not only for the individual case in
which it was rendered but also in all like cases."
(See also Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence,I,Sec.35 8 .)
(3) REASON OF THE DOCTRINE:
The reasons which underlie this rule are
stated by Chancellor Kent is a rm.ch quoted passar:' from
his Corimentaries, as follows: uA solemn decision upon a
point of law arising in any given case becomes an author-
ity in a like case, because it is the highest evidence
which we can have of the law applicable to the subject,
and tin judges are bound to follow that decision so long
as it stands unreversed, unless it can be shown that the
law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular
case. If a decision has been made upon solemn argument
5and mature deliberation, the presirption is in favor of
its correctness; and the comv-unity have a riht to re-
gard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law
and to regulate their actions and contracts by it. It
would, therefore, be extremely inconvenient to the public
if precedents were not duly regarded and implicitely
followed. It is by the notoriety and stability of such
rules that professional men can give safe advice to those
who consult the-,-, and people in general can venture with
confidence to buy and trust and to deal with each other.
If judicial decisions were to be lightly disregarded,
we should disturb and unsettle the great land-marks of
property. When a rule has been once deliberately adopted
and declared it ought not to be disturbed unless by a
court of appeal or review and never by the same court
except for very cogent reasons and upon a clear mani-
festation of error; and if the practice were otherwise
it would be leaving us in a state of rerplexing uncer-
tainty as to the law." (1 Kent's Com.,475; to the same
effect, Jones on Bailments, 60; L utler v. Duncomb, 1 P.
Wms.,4b2; Anderson v. Jackson, 16 Johns.,402; Bates v.
Reljea, 20 Jend.,340; Cooley's Const.Lim.,50.)
(4) I-2ORTANCE OF THE DOCTRI:-:
The importance of a strict and rational ad-
6herence to the doctrines of adjudged cases is remarkably
exemplified in the 7rowth o' l7nglish Constitutional
jurisprudence. To quote from a distinguished writer, on
public questions: "The principle of precedent is eminent-
ly philosophical. The English Constitution would not
have developed itself without it. What is called the
English Constitution consists of the fundamentals of the
Eritish polity laid down in customs, precedents, decisias
and statutes; and the conon law in it is a far greater
portion than the statute la,.u (Lieber's Civil Liberty.)
And in our own country the maintenance of this
doctrine is of peculiar importance on account of the
deference which we are accustomed to pay to the decisions
of the law courts even in cases where their logical
correctness is open to doubt. This recognition of the
power and provisions or the judicial tribunals in the
guidance and settlement of our civil institutions leads
the American citizen to Wield his implicite obedience
to their doctrines, even when the decision of a court
lays a controlling and shaping hand, not formally per-
haps, but, in the necossaj.y deductions from its con-
clusions, upon the most zealously debated political
questions or the most important affairs of government.
Then if progress is desirable, if the ;rowth of the
7nation in the perfect development of constitutional
governrnt as well as in the stability of its instiLu-
tions be a desideratum, these objects can certainly not
be abtained by a disregard of the principlo of Stare
Decisis. Our past history declares this truth with un-
mistakable voice. To appreciate its value we have only
to reflect how seriously the progro3s of American federal-
ism would have been retarded if the interpretation put
upon the Constitution by the Supreme Court in the forma-
tive period of our national character had been thought
open to contradiction by any and every court. An ob-
jection is sametimes made to the "adherence of courts to
musty, moldy authoriLies and antique forms mnd customs,
whereby they seem to be wedded to error and absurdities,
sanctioned and venerated merely because they have the
flavor of age about them, while everything else is re-
volving in the whirl of progress." Undoubtedly there is
some point in the sensure both as to statutes and ad-
judications, but the objection may easily b- carried too
far. There ought to be established standards of judg-
ment and it is too much to require that those shall be
absolutely infallible. Conservatism is equally as need-
ful in the movement of society, of politics, of science
8of law and of everything in which mankindlas a general
interest, as prog;ress is. And it is needful also to
demand duo credentials from every innovation and to re-
ceive propositions of change with slow deliberation, al-
though without prejudice. Conservatism and progress
should be, though opposites, yet co-operative, and con-
stantly in action. And it is highly proper that time
should largely enter into the authority, the sacredness
and the veneration attaching to customs and rules es-
tablished by the legal wisdom and learning of form, ner
sages of the law. For the longer a rule has continued
the more thoroughly has it become interwoven with the
business and property interests of the community at
large, and therefore the more disasterous must be the
change, especially a sudden change. When once a princi-
ple has been fully recognized it should not be changed
unless it is found to be unbearably wrong or unless it
is changed or abrogated by the legislature, to whom the
correction of errors ought usually to be left. "There
are rules concerning whicih it is more important that
they should be in some way settled than that they should
be settled in any particular mannor.
CHAPTER II.
PROPER LI .JITATIONS OF THE DOCTRINJE. The I-rinciple of
Stare Decisis is subject to certain necessary and propor
limitations which on the one hand secure and enhance its
practical utility and on the other prevent its abuse.
The more important of these limitations will be dis-
cussed.
(1) OVER-RULED CASES.
If a decision has been expressly over-ruled
either by the same court whicI rendered it or by a court
exercising appellate jurisdiction, it can, of course, no
longer be cited as a precedent. The latest utterance of
the court on any given point of law constitutes the
authority which is not to be departed from without cause.
And the same is true of decisions over-ruled by necossarY
implication in a subsequent case. Eut here it would be
necessary to show beyond reasonable cavil that the two
authorities were really and necessarily inconsistent
rulings on a state of facts substantially identical.
An excdption, however, would probably be made in the
case of a single decision probably erroneous, which would
over-rule a series of previous authorities or unsettle
the established principles of comercial law. (Aud v.
fdagruder, 10 Cal.282.) If a rule of law has been cliang-
ed by legislative enactment the autlxrities are unanimouls
that it is stripped of all bindin; force.
(2) TWO EXTREMES TO EE AVOIDED.
"That doctrine" says Lovie, J., slpeaking of
the rule under consideration, "though incapable of being
expressed by any sharp and rigid definition and there-
fore incapable of becoming an institute of =do positive
law is among the most important of good governrent. But
like all such principles in its ideal it presents its
medial and its extreme aspects and is approximately de-
fined by the negation of its extremes. The conservatism
that would make the institutions of to-day the rule of
to-morrow and thus cast society in the rigid molds of
positive law in order to get rid of the embarassing
but wholesome diversities of thought and practice that
enure to free,rational and imperfect beings; and the
radicalism that, in ignorance of the laws of hnnan prog-
ress and disregard of the rights of others, would lightly
esteem all official precedents and -eneral customs that
are not measured by its own idiosyncrasies; each of' these
extremes always tends to be converted into the other and
both stand rebuked in every voltue of our jurisprudence.
And the medial aspect of the doctrine stands every where
revealed as the only proper one. Ilot as au arbi-
trary rule of positive law attributinC to the mere memory
of cases higher honor and greater value than belongs to
the natural instincts and common feeling of right; not
as withholding allowance for official fallibility and for
the changing views, pursuits and customs that are caused
by and that indicate an advanced civilization; not as
underrating and thus deadening the form3 that give ex-
pressions to the living spirit; not as enforcing 'the
traditions of the elders' when the:, 'make void the law'
in its true sense; nor as fixing all opinions that have
ever been pronounced by official functionaries; but as
yielding to them the respect which their official char-
acter demnds and which all Food education enjoys.9
(CallendervKeystone 1,!ut. Life Ins.Co., 23 Pa.St.,474.)
(3) DECISION MANIFESTLY ERRONEOUS.
Hence, in the third place, if the decision is
clearly incorrect, whether from a mistaken conception of
the law or through the misapplication of the law to the
facts and no injurious results would be likely to flow
from a reversal of it and especially if it is injurious
and unjust in its operation, it is not only an allowable
departure from precedent but the iinlerative duty of the
court to reverse it. (Linrl v. 1M.inor, 4 Nev.,462; Paul v.
Davis, 100 Ind.,422; Snydor v. Gascoigne, 11 Tex.,449;
McDowell v. Oyer, 21 Pa.St.,423.)&
But from this rule is to be exfopted the case
of a settled and established rule of property founded
upon a series of erroneous decisions. It is only upon
serious considerations that the court will overthrow
such a rule no matter how incorrect the previous author-
ities. This point will be discu5sed in another con-
nection.
(4) ISOLATED CASES.
A single decision upon any given point of law
is not regarded as conclusive as a precedent in the same
degree that a series of decisions upon that point would
be. (Duff v. Fisher, 15 Cal., 375; 'ells on Res Adjudi-
cata &c., Sees.589,599.)
The Supreme Court of California declares that
the doctrine of Stare Decisis will load it to conf~rm
to a principle of merchantile law established all over
the world rather than to follow a decision of its own
made a few years before, which is a very decided and
injurious innovation upon that principle. (Aud v.
hiagrunder, 10 Cal.,282.)
(5) OBLITER DICTA.
The maxim of Stare Decisis contemplates only
such points as are actually involved and determined in
13
the case and not what is said by the court or judge out-
side of' the record or on points not necessarily involved
therein. Such expressions do not become precedents.
(Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat., 399; Rx Parte Christy, 3
How., 322, dissenting opinion of Catron, J.; Peck v.
Jenness, 7 11ow., 612; Carroll v. Carroll, 16 ]low.,287.)
In the case of Cohen v. Virginia (supra) Chief
Justice Mlarshall said: "It is a maxim not to be dis-
regarded that reneral expressions in every opinion are
to be taken in connection with the case in which those
expressions are used. If they go beyond the case they
may be respected but do not control the judgment in a
subsequent suit when the very point is presented. The
reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually
before the court is investigated with care and considered
in its full extent; other principles which may serve to
illustrate it are considered in their relation to the
case decided but their possible bearing on all the other
cases is seldom completely investigated.u
Iut this limitation of the maxim inhmm must
itself be taken with a limitation. Thus, although a
point may not have been fully argued, yet the decision of'
the court upon-
Thus, although that be the case the decision of the
14
acurt cannot be considered obliter dicta when the ques-
tion was directly involved in the issues of law raised
by demurrer and the mind of the court was directly drawn
to and distinctly expressed upon thie subject. (.ichael
v. .ore,, 26 I.d., 239.)
So, where a question rearded by the court as
of general importance is solermly decided after full
argument and consideration and with a purpose to settle
tie law, it has been held as not inconsistent with the
doctrine of obliter dicta that such a decision should
become a binding precedent, although the question was
not one necessary to be determined by the court. This
was laid down in the remarkably able opinion of the Court
of Appeals of haryland(in Alexander v. Worthington, 5
Md.,488,489): "All that is necessary to render a deci-
sion authoritative on any point decided is to show that
there was an application of the judicial mind to the pre-
cise question adjudged.u (See also Buchner v. R.1'.Co.,
60 Wis., 264; uells on Pes Adjudicata 3c., Sec.582.)
This seems to be a darerous liiuitation of the
doctrine and tends directly to rem-ove one of t;ie chief
supports and benefits of t.e doctrine of 5tare Decisis;
for if a court may consider a question not necessarily
involved in the case and render a decision thereon which
15
shall rise to the rank of a precedent it is easy to see
how soon our courts might be occupied in considering
purely academical topics and erecting into precedents
their vie-vs of what the law ought to be rather than what
it is. Whatever authority there may be for it, such a
limitation is opposed to the true idea and doctrine of
Stare Decisis. However well considered or wise or a
logical conclusion however irresistible or a conclusion
or analogy, it must be the very point, as Chief Justice
Marshall calls it, arising in the case. Webster de-
fines (fdecision" as "the act of settling or terminating
a controvercy by giving the victory to one side." If a
question is not in controvercy, no decision in the prop-
er sense of the word can be rendered on it. Again, "a
decision is the act of settling or terminating a contro-
vercy, but a process of reasoning, a syllogism or logical
induction or deduction is in no proper sense a decision
of a controvercy." For this reason a court often fol-
lows a decision as a precedent while expressly rejecting
the reason by which it was 6ririnally supported.
CHAPTER III.
THE RULE AS BETWEEN DIFFERENT COURTS
OF TIM SANE STATE.
(1) AS BETWEEN SUBORDINATE AND APPELLATE COURTS.
The rule is well laid down in the case of
Attorney-General v. Lunn (2 Wis.,507); the court there
said: "The decisions of the highest appellate court upon
points in judgment presented and passed upon in cases
brought before it are the law of the land until over-
ruled and inferior courts are bound to obey them." (See
also Gibson v. Chouteau, 7 ,,ro.App.,l.)
On the other hand the rule is equally well
settled that the opinion of a nisi prius court, though
perhaps admissible as persuasive evidence of the princi-
ple contended for is of course not binding as a precedent
upon the appellate court, except in one instance, viz,
that the Suprewe court will adopt the construction
placed by the inferior court upon its own rules of
practice, (miix v. Chandler, 44 Ill., 174).
The decisions of the chief appellate court of
a territory before its erection into a state, or of the
supreme court of a state prior to the adoption of a new
constitution, will be recognized and followed by its
successor under the new constitution unless manifestly
17
erroreous; (Doolittle v. Shelton, 1 Greene (Iowa),
272 ;
Emery v. Reed, 65-Cal., 351.)
(2) AS ETWEIEN COURTS OF CO-ORDINATE JURISDICTION.
It has been held by the supreme court of New
York that as between nisi rrius courts of the samne state,
the rule of Stare Decisis is in some instances applica-
ble. (Andrews v. Wallace, 29 T ar.5, 350; Bentley v.
Goodwin, 38 Barb., 633.) In the former New York case
the language of the court is as follows: uTwo or more
decisions concurring on the same Toint made by co-
ordinate branches of the sae court in different dis-
tricts should be recognized as precedents in the other
districts until reversed by a higher authority.' The same
rule has been acknowledged in federal court decisions.
(The Chelmsford, 34 Fed. Rep., 399; Reed v. Ry.Co.,21
Fed.Rey.,22S3.) In the case of the Chelmsford (supra)
the District Court for the Central District of Pa., an-
nounced that it followed a prior decision of' another
district on the same point, althouh it considered such
decision not foinded upon sound principles" So in, feed
v. Ry.Co.(C.C..Y.) (supra), in an action to establish
an implied maratime lieri arainst a vessel for Sll-lies
furnished at the hrome port at the owner's request and
shipped to the vessel elsewhere, the court said:"In nei-
18
ther case (referring to two prior decisions upon the
point by tile Circuit Courts of other districts) is the
subject discussed at any length or any adequate reason
assigned, in my judgment, for the conclusion reached.
So great, however, is the importance I attach to uni-
foriity of decisions by coul-ts of' co-ordinate jurisdic-
tion that I feel constrained to adopt the rule thus es-
tablished." (See also '.rs.ick £.1'g Co. v. City of
Phil., 0 Ped., U.S.D.C.Pa., 625; 1horton v. Taxing Dist.
xcc, 36 Fed.,99.)
But in a late Ciiucuit Court decision (.4orthern
Pacific T,.R.Co. v. Sanders, i.lont., 47 'fed., 604) it is
said: "Finally, plaintiff urges that when ()ne Circuit
court decides a point all the others should conform
their views to this decision until the matter is set-
tled by the rulings of' the Supreme Court. Dut this is
not the rule which prevails in the Circuit Courts of the
United States. A United States Circuit Court, undoubted-
ly always with reluctance will use its right to disagree
with the decisiona of another Circuit court even when
satisfied that it is erroneousi" The Court then pro-
ceeded to give a construction to the grant of Congress
in aid of the iorthern Pacific Railroad Company, directly
the opposite of a prior decision oi' the sa i:o subject by
another Circuit court, and concludes thus: "In the EiV)le
19
there is a coi~riand, 'Thou shalt not follow the pflltitude
to do evil'"which to the mind of the court apleared con-
elusive of the matter.
The rule is qualified and i'urther explained in
the case of Groenbaumn v. Stein (2 Daly,226), as follows:
"When there is a conflict ('t d,cisions on a given point
among the tribunals of' equal ra.n -k in a state the court
in which the point is decided upon mature deliberation
should adhere to its decision until over-r-uled by a
court of last resort."
Froi-m the brief quotations from circuit and
district court decisions (above) we can see the attitude
of the different circuits and districts as to the Doc-
trine of Stare Decisis. L4ut the question berore these
courts ia only whether or not the decision of another
district will be considered as binding until an adverse
decision of t he Supreme Court is rendered and conse-
quently the evils of a refusal to adhere to the principle
will not be great, because iMi iriportant cases involving
any considerable amount an apieal may be had from these
courts to thie Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S.
S.preme Court. The people c. e-n age in enterprises
with reference to the settled rulin.s of the latter
courts. By the Act of Congress, the Circuit Court of
20
Appeals of the United States was established (1891).
Final a.Tlellate jurisdiction i3 given to that cout in
many cases subject to a review in certain excer tional
cases by the -Supreme Court. I have carefully examined
the t,;;( volum° es of reported cases already issued from
the Cir.Ct. of Appeals and have failed to find any
decisions directly in conflict. Ii', however, any of the,
courts reftise to follow prior decinsions of other cir-
cuits the enormous evils and injuries resulting which
were prophesized by"nrlisl, critics at the time of the
passage of the act will undoubtedly be felt.
In L1-ew York, Virginia apid other states during
different periods of lon-er or shorter duration temporary
tribunals have been organized for the purpose of giving
aid to the court of last resort in t}he state when its
docket has becoi e crowded. One of these special courts
in Virginia having on its reversal of a decree rei-manded
the case for ilirthe_- lproceedins in the court below,
which lower colurt in the sequel pursued the mandate sent
it, the Supreme Court of that state on a second appeal
held that it could not entertain a complaint of error
either in or behind the decree of the special court.
(Polling v. Lersen, 26 Gratton, ,6; hiorvell v. Cam, 2
Rand.,68,85; Corvell v. Zeluff, 12 Gratton, 226,234.)
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In similar cases in !ow York, after a decision by the
Con-'nissioners of' Apjeals and a oocond appeal which came
before the Court of Appeals itself, the latter court
declined to inquire whether the J'oner court had l decided
rightly. (Terry v. Wait, 56 11-.Y., 91; relton v. Baxter,
58B.Y., 411.) And te samte is true as to the recent
Second Fivision of the Court of AI eals, (W1,annin- v.
P:eck, 129 I..Y., 7, (dictum).),
But in '.ew York when the questionl htis arisen
whether a decision of the Corrissioners of Appeals or a
decision of the Court of Appeals cozlflictin7 with it in
different cases should be follo-,ed by a s-ubordinate
court, the decision of the Court of Appeals has been
held entitled to preference as of higher authority,
without an attempt at estimating the comparative weight
of the several decisions them.iselves respectively con-
sidered on their own intrinsic orits. (Conner v. Veber,
12 11un, 580,584.1)
CIIAPT[!T: IV.
T'7.. RULE A-) ., WEF., [ JJD '.A,,
A'.]) STATE COURTS.
The decisions7 of th, e -IPo1 O 't ef' t- e
United S tates upon the costruction of the Federal Con-
stitution or t; o laws of thc Inion are concl,, sivo and
bindi.;--..;, :-on all te state tribunrals; both because the
inter. retation of the orr'Tanic lav and the statutes of
thie nation properly belonrs to its o'07 judiciary, and
bcause, that court e .rcises a certai, arpellate juris-
dictio. in these matters ,Vet tle courts of last resort
iu the several state:;. (Black v. Lusk, 69 III.,70;
TLeba o,-. 7ank v. 2 , -,- t.......
I ,onvers:7 of trhi 3 .- lo is c(3., lI true:
"ve fedoral courts wiil uni-c'nl - adop"t tiie decisions of
the state tribunals in the colisti-iction oi' t ieir statutes
and constitutions; and the iterpretation givr. to a law
of a st-ate b: its ii.) iest judicial tii a1 ic re:srded
in t e fCederal courts as a part of thie ,ltatute al is as
bindi: Uo.-. t,, e. as the text. (, ffi'imll v. . arren,
2 ; .... th v. Cc-,.oc'.',e-, 7 To. 198;
'istyr v. 1Pridh'u, 4 :-"Jai. , li; ".icliol v. TLevy, ! id.,
433; ','illia;a son v. Sriydar, 3 id., 7-.,; Randall v. Lr.r-
ham, 7 id., 52,; 7,or -an v. l.2irkid., (A; ,o V.
Ai-led e, 1 hcr.q)st , 620; ha _orrb v. 2o ,-, , 97 .3. , 181;
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Davis v. riggs, id.,628; Ry.Co. v. Ganies, id.,697;
Louisville etc. Ry. v. Liss., 133 U.S., 587; Peters v.
Bain, id., 670.) Thus on the question of ihether a
state tax law cniforms to the state constitution, the
federal courts are boumd b: ° decisions of the state courts
of last resort. (Dundee iortr. Co. v. Parris'-, 24 Fed.,
i37. )
But there is one exception to this rule, viz,-
When the constitutional enactment or statute is alleged
to be in violation of tha federal constitution or laws
the United States,
ofithe Supreme Court will be at liberty to put its own
construction upon it; for example, when the act in ques-
tion is objected to as controvonirv the constitutional
prohibition of lerislation impairing the obligation of
contracts tie court will ascertain for itself indepen-
dently of the state decisions whether a contract in fact
exists and whether the statute has tho effect attributed
to it. (Jeff. ranch Tank v. 3kelly, 1 '-lack (U.S.),436;
Louisville Qe. P. *v. Palmer, 109 U.1'., 244; Pennoyer v.
iefiT, 9b U.S., 714; Cass Co. v. St. Louis, 9b U.S.,485;
Gornibey v. Clark, 134 U.S., 53; Johnson v. Fisk, 137
U.S. 306.) But it seems the decision of tiho UOited
States Supreme Court sustaining a state statute is not
binding on a state court when the saieo question arises
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under a similar statute. (People v. Eudd, 117 N.Y.,I.)
And on the question of inter-state extradition, it is
said the decisions of the state courts do not conclude
federal courts. (Ex Parte fRoberts, 24 1'ed.,132.)
Where the rulings of the state court upon the
construction of its constitution or laws have been sub-
ject to lmanges of opinion the federal courts will in
general follow the latest settled adjudications. But
where a question was once definiLely settled by a series
of decisions in the state courtsuch decisions beitig aus-
taned by re"a= and authority, ahd one or two later
cases over-rule them against all law and reason the
Supreme Court will not feel bound to follow every oscil-
lation of opinion. (Gelpoke v. DubUque, 1 Wall., 175;
Marshall v. Elgin, 3 Mc~arn, C.Ct.,35, to sane effect)
And where the U.S. Circuit Court in a particular case
adopts the construction of a statute by the highest c curi
of the state and afterwards the state courts over-rule
the former decisions and interpret the statute differ-
ently, this will not authorize a reversal of the judgment
of the Circuit court. (IMnran v. Curtenius, 20 Iow.,l;
Pease v. Peck, 18 How., 595; Burgess v. Siligman, 107
U.S., 20; Keokuk v. Ry.Co., 41 Pod., 305.) So where the
Supreme Court has maturely adopted the construction
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placed by the State court on the statutes of the state
and the latter court afterwards gives a different inter-
pretation on the same act, it is deemed more respectable
to the U.S. Supreme Court for the Circuit and District
courts to adhere to its decisions rather than to adopt
the latest ruling of the State court until the question
shall be again reviewed. (Ileal v. Green, 1 cLoa", 18.)
But exactly the opposite course was taken in ':oore v.
Mleyer, (47 ±'ed. Rol., Cir. Ct., 99.).
In questions of -;neral cor -:ercial law t.e
state adjudications, though entitled to -reat respect,
do not furnish a binding rule of decision for the federal
courts; and conversely the state courts in s' c> matters
are not concluded by the rulings of the national courts.
(Supervisors v. SchonckO Wall.,772; owh" , v. R,7.Co.,
100 U.S., 213; 71irrgess v. Selignria, 107 U.S., 20; Towle
V. £Iorne-, 14 :;.Y., 423; l'ickle v. The 'tank 88 '_enn.,380J
Thus, although the rule that thc law of the place whore
a contract is made will ordinarily igovern its interrTre-
tation and applies to endorsements of ne'-ctialc paper,
yet when that law is the co:i !o- la: or la7 n'rci:ant the
question as to what such law is will not be concluded
by the decisions of the hi,-Qost corrts of the state w'here
the endorsement is made, suit bein" brought in a differ-
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ent jurisdiction. (Franklin v. Twogood, 25 Iowa, 520.)
And in such a question as this, the federal courts are
not bound by the adjudications of the state wit1in whose
border3 they sit. (National Fank v. Lock-sticl. Fence
Co., 20 Reporter, 235.)
So a decision of a state court involving only
the general principles of equity jurisprudence is not
binding as authority on the federal courts. )Neves v.
Scott, 13 How., 269; Russell v. Southard, 12 How.,
139.)
CHAPTFR V.
T}HE RULE AS BETWEE2N
COURTS OF DIFIEREITT STATES.
Rulings nmde under a similar system of juris-
prudence prevailing in another state ma be cited and
respected for their reasons but are not necessarily to
be accepted as g*ides, except in so far as those reasons
coirnond themselves to judicial mind. (Caldwell v. Gale,
11 Mich., 77; Boyce v. St. Louis, 29 Barb., 650.) The
decisions of another state, however, is accepted as
authoritative guides in cases where a construction of
the statutory law of suah state became necessary. (Lane
v. Watson, 51 N.J.Law, 186; Howe v. Welch, 14 Daly, 80;
Crooker v. Pearson, (Kan.), 21 Pac., 270.)
tut the opinion has been expressed that they
but
woUld be persuaSiveAnot conclusive as to such1 construc-
tion, where the statutes in question but not the deci-
sions ari put in evidence. (ITolson v. Goree, 34 Ala.,
555.)
CI APTER VI.
VALUE OF THE EIIGLISH DECISIO:7S.
"Great Britain and the thirteen original states
had each substantially the same system of conmon law
originallyand a decision now by one of the highent
courts of Great Britaili as to what the co, Tnon law Is
upon any point is certainly entitled t, -rsat respeot
in any6f'the states, though not necessarily to beeo.
cepted as binding authorityany acre than the decisionS
of any one of the other states, upon the sar- point.
It gives us the opinions of able judges as to what the
law is but its force as an authoritative declaration must
be confined to the country for wlich the court sits and
judges. But an PEn'lish decision before the revolution
is in thle direct line of authority." (Cooley's Const.
Lira., (star pa;e) 52; see also Chapman v. Gray, 8 Ga.,
341; Koontz v. Nabb., 16 ;d,, b49.)
CUAPTZR VII.
STATUTES 0' 02. SfATE R:471AC'2D
I: ANOTER.
Where a particular statute or clausi of the
-, c:-.stitution has been adopted in, 0 state :1'c_- t:lc
statute ; o:- -,:,stitut.on of another after a judicial
corstruction has been put upon it in the last mentioned
,;tate, i is but just to .er-ard the costruction as
_,av .... been adoptedalong with t'.a words, a::d all the :,:ia-
chief's of di:xoePardixf precedlc-.ts would follow as le-iti-
mrrately hero as in any other case. (Co:.. v. Hartntt',
3 'ra,., 450; Bo -- is v. ,ecker, 1 .s., 226; CooleyIs
Co~t. Li;-., 52.) .>i it does rot follow necessarily
that the prior decision crrstr vi7 't :c lau itst be in-
flexibly followed, since t',c circ'-stances in the state
adorting it -ft:, be so different as to require a differ-
ent co:istructLio.. (Little v. 2'-*th, 4 Scai,.., 402; Cray
v. Askew, 3 C( io, 479; oole. Coast. Tir:.,52 n.)
And the sa-m is in r-eneral true ol Englis: statutes re-
enacted in thiis country. Thus, . Justice Story ob-
serves: "It is dc'-tless tr,e as has o s"'-:t"& at
the bar that wo En,-,lis>* statutes -- stt?> for exa ple
as the Statute of Frauds and t..- Statuze o f Li.-itatio-.
-- have beeh adopted into our own leislatio." tie known
and settled construction of <'.ose statutes by coiut: of
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law had been considered as silently incorporated into
the acts or has been received with all the weight of
authority." (Pennocck v. Dial'orue, 2 Peters, 18.)
CHAPTER VIII.
PROPERT( RIGITS TOT TO T" DIS
'J'MLZED 1Y REVERSAL OF DECISIO!S.
There are sonie que3tionn in law, the firal settle-
ment of which is vastly ,more important than how t;ey are
settled; and wiong these are rules of property long re-
cognized and acted upon an;] tmder which rights have
vested. Aeordingly when a principle of law, doubtful
in its character and unertain in the subject matter of
its oblif-ation has been settled by a series of judicial
decisions the court will hesitate lon,- before attempting
to ov :rthrow the result, notwithstanding t::' ray think
the previoi authorities to be e-tirely erroneous. (Prat
v. i:rvwn, 3 is., 609; Rockhill v. .oalson, 24 Ind.,422;
Harrow v. .lyers, 21J Id., 469; Yield v. Coldshy, 2t Ila.,
218; :ihn v. C~rtis, '1 CZl., 398; Emerson v. Atwater,
7 .ich., 12; Paulson v. City of 2ortland, 19 ?ac., (Or.),
450; In re Tasftar ('91) 1 Th., 3bS; Frank v. Exansvill
F.P.Co. (Id), L [:.F.., lOb; 3cott v. Stenart (na.), 11
8 ,97; Ross v. RcrsS (O'.), 26 1'ac., 0CO:.)
I - such oases it is liotter to leave te cor-
rection cf the error to tho ieislatunre u2icl can cortrol
its action so as to make it prospeotivc only and tihus
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prevent unjus4. consequences. "t these authrities
must not be understood as holding that a previous line
of lecisions affecting property rirghts oan in any case
be ovor-,iil!hd. That would be pushin the doctrine al-
to"ether too far. Hence if it s'ould a i ear thA-. tAe
evil3 resultin, from the princi- les ostallisied -nst be
prodlctive of -reat-r mischior to t. e co ; unity th}L:: can
possibly ensue fCor- disrof-ardin! the pi-vious ad.3ica-
tinns on tlve subject t'e new -ol" Thm;Id ,e c.eated.
(Poon v. :owers, 30 ss., 246; '3ll~dol v. Jahso,-, 20
Johns., 722; Oakl,r v. Aspinwall, 13 i,.Y., 500;1unifs v.
Fmor -uson, 34 IJI. * 4'5; .To3lin v o,,56 Td ., 6M6
.1, itaTER IX.
L IAW OF TIlE C ASP1.
a case has been I'ecided ii .n appellate
court and : .oerwards Oames there a ain b.; ajpeal or o:vit
of error only , quesltions will. be noticed as were riot
deiber:,Ined in ti prevui, dec ison; t )i ints ,> law
ali",ady adji. dicated bec~o I tVi law ol tY, cVmse and ill
not be reversed or dfr ntCd i'om (or rnicr a l' to
in any of its subsequent sta'es. (drbase v. C. , 9b
1. Y.1 T,; iA Joeiin v. Coweo, tM6 id., 26; ]urnlss v.
e,-tlson, .-4 id., 45; Joslin v. Cowrie, 56 id., 626;
0: k e? v Asp nTa l , I ,A.'10;f}{ veral~l v . ,111is, 38
,-s., 20 .; ',A lan v , . r, i o 20 Cal., 4 1 ; Dzv d.sor,
v. 15 iId., 8) j ortPss ii' the facts ohani
on a s)oCld trial of the TIrrl% caoso in, tbn court :, tew
afte ,' . Iding, these 3oay .o can,.e ti' whole nature
of tLo c;-st ' to require iE ne~~ ~v' a.-3 oal
tlvn, eto; a3d Ci -a, t o , Prv - deci 1il c)so.3 to be tVN
lhw rf t]le ':-e. 2'Pot- :t iS cl;, that a p.arty cm a r.-
trixl-, de novo i ay iitroduce 4-.r; eviienco and e tablish
an ontirely difr'ent state of fracLts ,o c(XLLorm to which
is no vi',d Ation e, rinciplis in a c;r'L o.ven ii" thevet, y
it does sct aside its forrinre deci siop. a. i. aj ,lic lc
cnqj aOorL a nmw 010 f itoed t fo te nYio T.'iase (t. ti
cov.trovrccy. (bus on 1V ::,i. ,3OC.,GlO; d0 cai.,671 ;
CTAPTER X.
Where the deliberations of the appollato court re-
sult in an aifirmance of' the Jukd,-i ont of the trial
cou.t in ce,-aequence of an oq,,al division of opinion
,mon- the jud-1es tio bindin, rrecodent iz t:or es-
tablished. The Jd i nt in such a case, alt.iough it is
as conclusive upon tio riqlhts of the parties to the
litication :.s any other would be (Durant v. Rusx Co.,
7 Wall., 107) is not considered a3 settling the q(ues-
tiOns of law as to cases which fnay arie between other
parLies. (Iors v. 11old, I ,.,., 2Pb; rid'e v.
Johnson, 5 Wend., '142; Etti i v. -,nk (f U.S., 12 wheat.,
5 9,7 W.
CFAPTPJR XI.
C T 0 C T. I 0
The doctrineo f taro Decisi' wa. be said to
be a rmch abused one. "aartists i otl,2r fields have
satirized it as a barreni and illogical dogzma; philoso-h-
era, so called, have characl.orized it as a *crude rells
of primitive u4 ireason ' idealists of all 4inds have
marked it as the stiumbling block to t, true devaloxnent
oi the science of the law; even the courts have dealt
it almost ciu,.in:-, blows (For exam'plo, se, The Leal
Tendor Cases, 13 Wall., 457, riversing, " ''a.,60).
Neertheless, it has survived.
The great result of the doctrine and idea of
Stare Decisis has been tat it has linked the whole of
our law to-other with bonds stronger than philosophy or
pure science could have constructed. As has been at-
tented to be shown in the precedinf- pages of thils essay,
without th- Loctrine there could be no suitable or con-
sistent administration o JustiCe, no firm foundlation
even to vested rights, no security to property.

